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STRANGERS WITH OUR FACES: HOW THE
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT CAN PREVENT
RIGHT OF PUBLICITY STUNTS
Ericka H. Spears*

I. INTRODUCTION
Ha Ha Ha! 1 Walking into your office, you are greeted by snickering
co-workers. Worried that you have something stuck in your teeth, you
quickly rush to the restroom where you are greeted by your best friend
who says, “Wow, I really thought you told me everything, I didn’t know
you were into swinging!” Thoroughly confused at this point, you ask,
“What are you talking about?” She responds, “Everyone has seen you
on AdultFriendFinder.com.” You have never heard of this website, let
alone registered on it. After several minutes of awkward silence, your
friend notices your utter confusion, and says, “Why don’t I show you
what everyone is talking about.”
Ten minutes later, you are horrified to discover a profile featuring a
digitally altered image of yourself, which you have never seen. The
profile features your actual hometown, hair color, eye color, and height–
enough information to lead anyone who knew you to believe that the
profile was yours. However, this is where the similarities stop. The
profile is filled with details about what you are looking for in a partner
as well as your sexual habits and proclivities, none of which are true. If
this was not enough, suddenly your office phone rings and your boss
asks to speak with you. A sinking feeling settles in the pit of your
stomach as you walk to his office.
“Fired!” Your world has suddenly been turned upside down. This
morning you were an average employee, but now your reputation and
career are ruined because a stranger used your image on an adult
website. You try to recover from the damage this posting caused your
commercial value by bringing a claim for misappropriation of the right
of publicity, but the judge tells you that your claim is barred by a statute
* Associate Member, 2009–2010 University of Cincinnati Law Review. The author would like
to thank God and her parents, Virgil and Patricia Spears, for their continued love and support.
1. This hypothetical is based on the situations faced by the Plaintiffs in Doe v. Friendfinder
Network, 540 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.H. 2008) and Carafano v. Metrosplash, 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir.
2003). The Plaintiffs in both cases were women who had total strangers use their identity on websites
and were then left to face the repercussions.
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that protects the interests of operators and users of interactive computer
services. 2
Real plaintiffs have suffered this injustice, by being precluded from
bringing right of publicity claims under Section 230 (§ 230) of the
Communications Decency Act (CDA). 3
This Comment examines the various approaches applied by federal
circuits regarding whether the immunity from tort liability granted by
§ 230 to operators and users of interactive computer services 4 that
publish information provided by a third party applies to Internet content
providers, such as Internet dating sites, facing liability for the tort of
misappropriation of the right of publicity. Part II of this Comment
discusses the history of both the Communications Decency Act and the
state law of the right of publicity. Part III explores the current split
among the federal circuits regarding whether § 230 permits state law
claims for misappropriation of the right of publicity. Part IV argues
right of publicity claims should be exempt from § 230 immunity based
on the right of publicity’s traditional characterization as an intellectual
property claim, the strict statutory interpretation of § 230(e)(2), and the
public policy interests of state law makers in developing right of
publicity law and Congress in passing § 230. Finally, in Part V, this
Comment joins the First Circuit in classifying the right of publicity as an
intellectual property right exempt from CDA immunity.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
An overview of the CDA and an introduction to the right of publicity
provide the background information necessary to fully understand the
context in which courts interpret § 230. Subpart A of this Part discusses
the policy considerations taken into account by Congress when passing
§ 230 of the CDA. Subpart B discusses the history and policy behind
the right of publicity and how to bring a cause of action for the
2. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2006) (“The term ‘interactive computer service’ means any
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by
multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the
Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.”). “Most
courts have held that through these provisions, Congress granted interactive services of all types,
including blogs, forums, and listservs, immunity from tort liability so long as the information is provided
by a third party.” Citizen Media Law Project, Immunity for Online Publishers Under the
Communications Decency Act, http://www.citmedialaw.org/legal-guide/immunity-online-publishersunder-communications-decency-act (last visited June 5, 2010).
3. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006). “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.” Id.
4. See id.
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misappropriation of the right of publicity.
A. Legislative History of § 230 of the Communications Decency Act
The CDA was originally passed to regulate obscenity and indecency
on the Internet. 5 Section 230, which protects users and operators of
interactive computer services from liability for content posted by third
parties, was not part of the original Senate legislation, but was added in
a conference with the House of Representatives. 6 This provision was
passed in part as a reaction to Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services
Co., a controversial New York Supreme Court decision which held that
online service providers could be held liable for the speech of their
users. 7
An unidentified user of Prodigy’s Money Talk bulletin board created
a post which claimed that Stratton Oakmont, Inc., a securities
investment banking firm and its president, committed fraudulent and
criminal acts in connection with an initial public offering of stock. 8
Stratton Oakmont sued Prodigy, arguing that Prodigy should be liable as
the publisher of the defamatory material. 9 Despite Prodigy’s reliance on
the district court’s prior decision in Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe Inc., 10
which found that an Internet service provider was not liable as a
publisher for user-generated content, the court held that Prodigy was
liable as the publisher of the content created by its users because it
exercised editorial control over the messages on its bulletin boards. 11
5. Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 560–61 (1996).
6. Tara E. Lynch, Good Samaritan or Defamation Defender? Amending the Communications
Decency Act to Correct the Misnomer of Section 230 . . . Without Expanding ISP Liability, 19
SYRACUSE SCI. & TECH. L. REP. 1, 8 (2008). “The original Senate version of the CDA included only
the prohibitions against and penalties for distributing obscene material over the Internet to minors, and
did not include section 230, which was added by conference amendment in the House of
Representatives.” Id.
7. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24,
1995), superseded by statute, Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 509,
§ 230(c)(1), 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c)(1) (2006)). “The amendment
[Section 230], proposed by Representatives Chris Cox (R-CA) and Ron Wyden (D-CA), came as
a direct response to the New York decisions Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc. and Stratton Oakmont, Inc.
v. Prodigy Services. Specifically, the amendment statutorily overruled the then-recent Stratton Oakmont
decision, which had held an ISP could be held liable for defamatory material posted by its users.”
Lynch, supra note 6, at 8–9.
8. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *1.
9. Id.
10. Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
11. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *4. The New York court found that Prodigy
exercised editorial control over the messages on its bulletin boards in three ways: 1) posting Content
Guidelines for users, 2) enforcing those guidelines through “Board Leaders” and 3) utilizing screening
software designed to remove offensive language. Id. at *4–5.
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The decision in Stratton Oakmont had a potential chilling effect,
leaving “providers of interactive computer services with the choice of
either monitoring and editing posts by third parties and therefore
accepting some liability for the content of the postings, or not
monitoring any posts by third parties no matter how objectionable the
content, thereby avoiding liability.” 12 Congress acknowledged this
dilemma motivated the creation of § 230, 13 which states that “no
provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.” 14 Through this provision Congress granted most
internet service providers immunity from liability for publishing false or
defamatory material so long as it was provided by another party. 15
Congress enacted § 230 for two basic policy reasons: to promote the
free exchange of information and ideas over the Internet and to
encourage voluntary monitoring for offensive or obscene material. 16
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed these policy concerns in
Zeran v. America Online, Inc., a case concerning the posting of
offensive messages regarding the Oklahoma City Bombing on an
America Online (AOL) bulletin board, and holding that AOL, as an
internet service provider, was immune from liability under § 230. 17 The
Fourth Circuit addressed the chilling effect on speech that may result
from holding internet service providers liable as publishers and
expresses a fear that internet service providers “might choose to severely
restrict the number and type of messages posted” in order to avoid being
faced with potential liability for each message republished by their
services. 18 The court addressed the encouragement of voluntary
monitoring for offensive material, noting that Congress enacted § 230’s
broad immunity “to remove disincentives for the development and
utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents
to restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online
12. Matthew Minora, Comment, Rumor Has It That Non-Celebrity Gossip Website Operators
are Overestimating Their Immunity Under the Communications Decency Act, 17 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 821, 831 (2009).
13. Cybertelecom: Good Samaritan Reference 47 U.S.C. § 230, http://www.cybertelecom.org/
cda/samaritanref.htm (last visited May 21, 2010).
14. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006). “The term ‘information content provider’ means any person or
entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided
through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.” Id. § 230(f)(3).
15. See Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1026–27 (9th Cir. 2003). An “internet service provider”
is “[a] business that offers Internet access through a subscriber’s phone line, usually charging the user
for the time spent connected to the business’s server.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
16. See Batzel, 333 F.3d at 1026–30.
17. Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997).
18. Id. at 331.
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material.” 19
Congress even codified its policy reasons for passing § 230 within the
language of the statute itself. Section 230(b) states that:
It is the policy of the United States – (1) to promote the continued
development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and
other interactive media; (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free
market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer
services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation; (3) to encourage the
development of technologies which maximize user control over what
information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the
Internet and other interactive computer services; (4) to remove
disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering
technologies that empower parents to restrict their children’s access to
objectionable or inappropriate online material; and (5) to ensure vigorous
enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in
obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer. 20

In summary, in order to counteract the negative implications of the
Stratton Oakmont decision, which held that online service providers
could be held liable for the speech of their users, Congress enacted § 230
of the CDA. Congress had two goals in mind when immunizing users
and operators of interactive computer services from liability for content
posted by third parties: to promote the free exchange of information and
ideas over the Internet and to encourage voluntary monitoring for
offensive material.
B. The Right of Publicity: Where Intellectual Property Law Meets Torts
The right of publicity is “a right inherent to everyone to control the
commercial use of identity and persona and recover in court damages
and the commercial value of an unpermitted taking.” 21 The right of
publicity shares aspects of property law and of tort law. From the
plaintiff’s perspective, the right of publicity is intellectual property
capable of being “licensed” and “trespassed upon.” 22 However, from
the defendant’s perspective, infringement on the right of publicity is a
tort of unfair competition developed from the tort of privacy. 23
In order to understand how the right of publicity became a “mixture
of personal rights, property rights, and rights under the law of unfair
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
47 U.S.C. § 230(b) (2006).
1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS of PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2d ed. 2009).
Id. § 1:7.
Id.
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competition,” 24 an exploration of its history and policy is necessary.
This Subpart first discusses the historical development of the right of
publicity from its origins in the right of privacy to its recognition as an
independent doctrine. Second, this Subpart explores the public policy
reasons for having a right of publicity in state law. Finally, this Subpart
discusses the development of the cause of action for the
misappropriation of the right of publicity.
1. Historical Development of Right of Publicity Law
The right of publicity, a state-created intellectual property right, is
defined as “the inherent right of every human being to control the
commercial use of his or her identity.” 25 This right developed within the
domain of privacy law, specifically the right “to be let alone.” 26
However, the right “to be let alone” only applied in cases where
anonymous persons saw their identities used without permission in
widely circulated advertisements. 27 The right “to be let alone” did not
directly address the issue of how celebrities could prevent the
unauthorized commercial use of their image. 28
Therefore, the
boundaries of the law of privacy were stretched when “famous
plaintiffs” began to appear in court, arguing not that they wanted no one
to commercialize their identity, but that they wanted the right to control
when, where, and how their identity was used. 29
Finally, in 1953, Judge Jerome Frank recognized that the law needed
an alternative view of the right to control the commercial use of one’s
identity, and the new label, the “right of publicity,” was born in the case
Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum. 30 In Haelan, the
plaintiff, a chewing gum distributor, who signed a contract with baseball
players for an exclusive right to use their pictures on advertising, sued
the defendant, claiming that the defendant invaded plaintiff’s exclusive
24. Id.
25. Id. § 1:3.
26. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196
(1890).
27. MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 1:7.
28. Id. § 1:38. “Well known personalities . . . do not seek the ‘solitude and privacy’ which
Brandeis and Warren sought to protect.” Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 203–04 (1954) (quoting Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 196 (1890)). “Indeed, privacy is the one thing they do ‘not want, or need.’” Id. at 204
(quoting Gautier v. Pro-Football, 304 N.Y. 354, 361 (1952)). “[T]he well known personality does not
wish to hide his light under a bushel of privacy, neither does he wish to have his name, photograph, and
likeness reproduced and publicized without his consent or without remuneration to him.” Id.
29. See MCCARTHY, supra note 21, §§ 5:63 to 5:67.
30. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
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right to use the photographs by inducing the players to allow their image
to be used on defendant’s competing chewing gum. 31 Judge Frank
recognized that in addition to the right of privacy, persons have a “right
of publicity” in their photographs, which in this case meant each
baseball player’s right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his
picture. 32
The Supreme Court first addressed the right of publicity in Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., a case in which a performer brought
an action against a television broadcasting company to recover damages
allegedly suffered when the broadcasting company videotaped his entire
performance and played the videotape on a television news program
without his consent. 33 The Court held that “the First and Fourteenth
Amendments do not immunize the [news] media [from civil liability]
when they broadcast a performer’s entire act without his consent,” and
that the Constitution does not prevent a state from requiring broadcasters
to compensate performers. 34 The Court found that “the broadcast of a
film of petitioner’s entire act poses a substantial threat to the economic
value of that performance,” because “if the public can see the act free on
television it will be less willing to pay to see it at the fair,” and the
broadcast “goes to the heart of petitioner’s ability to earn a living as an
entertainer.” 35 Furthermore, the Court stated that protecting the
petitioner’s right of publicity “provides an economic incentive for him to
make the investment required to produce a performance of interest to the
public.” 36 Though “entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First
Amendment protection,” and “entertainment itself can be important
news,” “neither the public nor respondent will be deprived of the benefit
of petitioner’s performance as long as his commercial stake in his act is
appropriately recognized.” 37 Therefore the court in Zacchini not only

31. Id. at 867.
32. Id. at 869.
33. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977). The plaintiff “perform[ed] a
15-second ‘human cannonball’ act in which he [was] shot from cannon into a net some 200 feet away.”
Id. at 562. The plaintiff asked a freelance reporter who attended the fair where he performed not to film
the performance. The freelance reporter “returned the following day and filmed the entire act.” Id. The
resulting film clip was approximately 15 seconds long (the length of the performer’s entire act) and was
shown on the 11 o’clock news program that night. Id. The plaintiff then sued the broadcasting company
in state court, alleging an “unlawful appropriation” of his “professional property.” Id. This case is the
only right of publicity case taken by the Supreme Court. Fred M. Weiler, The Right of Publicity Gone
Wrong: A Case for Privileged Appropriation of Identity, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 223, 232
(1994).
34. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575.
35. Id. at 575–76.
36. Id. at 576.
37. Id. at 578.

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2011

7

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 10
SPEARS FINAL FORMAT 2

416

2/11/2011 4:19:53 PM

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

recognized the existence of the right of publicity, but also carved out the
“newsworthy” exception to the right. 38
Currently, nineteen states recognize the right of publicity via statute, 39
and the right exists by common law in many states that have not
legislatively defined the right. 40 The variations between state right of
publicity laws have generated scholarly debate over whether a federal
right of publicity statute would be beneficial. 41 The Patent, Trademark
and Copyright Section of the American Bar Association has
occasionally explored federalization of the right of publicity. Due to
parallels with trademark law, some have proposed that the proper place
to create a federal right of publicity is within the federal trademark
statute, commonly known as the Lanham Act. 42 Nevertheless, efforts to
federalize the right of publicity have broken down under the strains of
competing interests. 43
2. Policy Justifications for the Right of Publicity
There are several policy justifications for having a right of publicity.
First, there is a natural rights argument that “[e]ach and every human
should be given control over the use of his or her identity” simply
because it is his or her identity. 44 This view “posits that a right of
publicity should be protected the same as any other property right,”
meaning that “the identifiable aspects of a person’s identity or ‘persona’
should be legally recognized as the person’s ‘property,’ protectable
against unpermitted commercial use.” 45 Closely related to the natural
rights argument is the right of “autonomous self-definition,” which
argues that “the right of publicity prevents unauthorized commercial

38. Id. at 574–75, 578 (stating that the right of publicity does not prevent the media from
reporting “newsworthy facts” about the plaintiff’s act, but clarifying that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution do not immunize the media when broadcasting a “performer’s entire
act without his consent”).
39. MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 6:8. The states that have recognized the right of publicity via
statute are: CA, FL, IN, IL, KY, MA, NY, NE, NV, OH, OK, PA, RI, TN, TX, UT, VA, WA, and WI.
40. Id. The states in which the courts have recognized a common law right of publicity are: AZ,
AL, CA, CT, FL, GA, HI, IL, KY, MI, MN, MO, NH, NJ, OH, PA, TX, UT, WV, and WI.
41. See Symposium, Rights of Publicity: An In-Depth Analysis of the New Legislative Proposals
to Congress, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 209 (1998).
42. Id. at 209–10. However, the Lanham Act may not be the optimal place for a federal right of
publicity for the simple reason that causes of action under the Act are limited to some form of falsity,
while infringement of the right of publicity involves no element of falsity. 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28:14 (4th ed. 2010).
43. See Symposium, supra note 41, at 209–10.
44. MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 2:1.
45. Id. § 2:2.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss1/10

8

Spears: STRANGERS WITH OUR FACES: HOW THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT CAN
SPEARS FINAL FORMAT 2

2010]

2/11/2011 4:19:53 PM

STRANGERS WITH OUR FACES

417

uses of a person’s identity that interfere with meanings and values that
the public associates with that person.” 46 In other words, people should
have the right to control their identity because it’s theirs, and because it
belongs to them, they should have the right to control the way it is
perceived by others.
There are also several economic policy reasons for having a right of
publicity. The incentive justification suggests that certain persons
should be given an economic incentive to engage in the socially
beneficial activity of entering the public eye. Since a person must
sacrifice some amount of privacy to be in the public eye, in return they
should have the opportunity to gain from the marketable value of their
identity. 47 There is also a micro-economic-based justification for a right
of publicity, which recognizes the principle that “granting individuals
exclusive rights to property is an effective way of allocating scarce
resources.” 48 Thus “granting a property right in a person’s identity will
result in the best and most efficient use of a person’s name and
likeness.” 49 Lastly, there is the argument that the right of publicity can
be justified by the need to prevent fraudulent business practices—
namely falsity in business promotions such as product endorsements and
product tie-ins. 50 This theory is based on the assumption that many
commercial uses of a person’s identity contain false representations
regarding a person’s endorsement of the product.
Such
misrepresentations injure the person featured in the endorsement by
associating him or her with a product or service he or she does not
actually support and injures the consuming public by misleading claims
of endorsement. 51
Because the right of publicity is based on a person’s commercial
value and many of the policy reasons behind the right focus on
economic considerations, many right of publicity cases deal with

46. Id. § 2.9 (citing M.P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67
U. PITT. L. REV. 225 (2005)).
47. Id. § 2:6.
48. Id. § 2:7; Richard A. Posner, John A. Sibley Lecture: The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV.
393, 411 (1978) [hereinafter Posner, Right of Privacy]; RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW § 3.3 (4th ed. 1992) [hereinafter POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS].
49. MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 2:7. See also Posner, Right of Privacy, supra note 48, at 411;
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 48, § 3.3.
50. MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 2.8; Peter L. Felcher & Edward L. Rubin, Privacy, Publicity
and the Portrayal of Real People by the Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1600 (1979).
51. MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 2.8. The right of publicity is often invoked in the context of
commercial speech when the appropriation of a celebrity likeness creates a false and misleading
impression that the celebrity is endorsing a product. See Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093 (9th
Cir.1992); see also Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988).
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celebrities. 52 In fact, while the majority view is that the right of
publicity is an inherent right for everyone, including non-celebrities, a
minority view concludes only “celebrities” have a right of publicity. 53 It
has been argued that the right should only attach to those who
“consciously seek pecuniary reward from the exploitation of the
publicity value of their names and likenesses.”54 Conversely, those who
believe “everyone has a right of publicity” believe that “[w]hile a
celebrity’s right of publicity will usually have a greater economic value
than that of a non-celebrity, this governs only the amount of damages,
not the very existence of the right.” 55
Many “courts use the
commonsense rule that if a defendant uses [the] plaintiff’s personal
identity for commercial purposes, then it will be presumed that
plaintiff’s identity had commercial value.” 56
3. Bringing a Cause of Action for Misappropriation of the Right of
Publicity
When the commercial interest in a person’s identity is infringed upon,
the resulting claim for restitution is misappropriation of the right of
publicity, a commercial tort of unfair competition. 57 In order to
establish this cause of action, plaintiffs must prove (1) the validity of
their right of publicity; and (2) that this right has been infringed upon by
the defendant. 58
There are currently two tests used to establish this cause of action.
Under common law, the plaintiff must prove the following elements:
“(1) the defendant used plaintiff’s identity or persona; (2) the
appropriation of the persona was for the defendant’s commercial
advantage; (3) the plaintiff did not consent to the use [of his or her
identity]; and (4) the use is likely to cause an injury to [the] plaintiff.” 59
Currently, however, more courts follow a two-pronged test, which
requires the plaintiff to prove that: (1) the “[d]efendant, without
permission, has used some aspect of identity or persona in such a way
that plaintiff is identifiable from defendant’s use;” and (2)
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 4:2.
Id. §§ 4:15, 4:16.
Id. § 4:15.
Id. § 4:14.
Id. § 4:17.
Id. § 3:1.
Id. § 3:2 (citing Prima v. Darden Rest., Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 337 (D.N.J. 2000)).
Thomas Phillip Boggess V, Cause of Action for an Infringement on the Right of Publicity, in
31 CAUSES OF ACTION 121, §§ 6–13 (2d ed. 2006). See also Eastwood v. Super. Ct., 198 Cal. Rptr. 342
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983).
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“[d]efendant’s use is likely to cause damage to the commercial value of
that persona.” 60
The first prong of the two-prong test has three sub-elements; the
plaintiff must be able to prove that the defendant (1) without consent (2)
used a characteristic of the plaintiff’s identity in a manner from which
(3) plaintiff was identifiable. 61 The first sub-element, whether the
plaintiff consented to the defendant’s use of his or her image, is usually
a straightforward issue easily determined by the courts. 62 After lack of
consent is established, a plaintiff must prove that some aspect of his or
her identity was used. 63 Most right of publicity cases involve the use of
a plaintiff’s distinguishable name, photograph, or likeness. 64 With
respect to the third sub-element, the law has not yet developed a clearcut definition of “identifiability”; although it is clear, the use of the
plaintiff’s name, image, or likeness must be more than an incidental or
coincidental similarity. 65
Plaintiffs must show that a defendant, without permission, used some
aspect of their identity or persona in such a way that they are
identifiable.
Once this showing is made, plaintiffs must still
demonstrate that the defendant used their persona for commercial or
trade purposes in a manner that would likely cause damage to their
commercial value. 66 A classic example of the use of an individual’s
identity or persona for trade purposes is the use of the individual’s
likeness to advertise the defendant’s goods or services. 67 Determining
the commercial status of the defendant’s use often involves balancing
the right of publicity against the broader right of free speech provided by

60. MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 3:2.
61. Id.
62. Minora, supra note 12, at 855–56 (“On the whole, whether the plaintiff consented to the
defendant’s use of his or her image is a clear-cut issue and easily determined by the trier of fact.”);
Boggess, supra note 59, § 12 (“Typically, the issue as to whether there was consent is obvious.”).
63. MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 4:46.
64. See Doe v. Friendfinder Network, Inc., 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 292, 304 (D.N.H. 2008)
(Image); see also Ali v. Playgirl, Inc. 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Portrait); Beverly v. Choices
Women’s Med. Ctr. Inc., 587 N.E.2d 275, 278 (N.Y. 1981) (Image); Henley v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, 46
F. Supp. 2d 587, 594–95 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (Name).
65. See Henley, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 594–95 (“there are many ways a plaintiff can be identified in a
defendant’s use” and plaintiff’s identifiability “will probably not be a disputable issue in the majority of
meritorious [r]ight of [p]ublicity cases.” (citing 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS of PUBLICITY
AND PRIVACY § 3:2 (1998))). See also, e.g., Hooker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 551 F. Supp.
1060, 1062 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (finding plaintiff not identified by the similarity in name between the
plaintiff, a famous sculptor, and the defendant’s creation of the same name, a television character in a
fictional police drama).
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46, 49 (1995).
67. Id. § 47.
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the First Amendment. 68 For instance, “the use of a person’s identity in
news reporting, commentary, entertainment, works of fiction or
nonfiction, or in advertising that is incidental to such uses” is not
ordinarily an infringement of the right of publicity, 69 precluding a
finding of commercial damage. Therefore, an individual’s right of
publicity is often found to be more valuable than commercial speech and
less valuable than informative or political speech. 70
The right of publicity blossomed as a separate legal theory when the
right of privacy failed to protect celebrity plaintiffs. Today, the right of
publicity is generally recognized as an intellectual property right
belonging to everyone. The majority of states and the Supreme Court
have recognized the right of publicity as a legitimate legal theory. There
are several key public policy reasons for recognizing a person’s right of
publicity. Everyone should have the right to protect their commercial
identity and the way their identity is perceived by the public.
Furthermore, those who sacrifice their privacy to be in the public eye
should have the opportunity to gain from the marketable value of their
identity and to allocate the use of their identity in the public to maintain
its value. Allowing persons to protect and manage their commercial
identity also limits the amount of fraudulent business practices in
advertising and related fields. Today, if potential plaintiffs can prove
that some aspect of their identity has been used without their permission
in a way that is likely to cause damage to their commercial value, they

68. See Boggess, supra note 59, § 19. “The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects
certain types of speech. Of all the different areas of speech, ‘commercial speech’ has the lowest level of
protection under the First Amendment.” Id. (citing Pallas v. Crowley, Milner & Co., 33 N.W.2d 911
(Mich. 1948); Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180 (9th Cir. 2001)). “Any speech that
has as its focus imploring the audience to buy a product or service is labeled commercial speech for First
Amendment purposes.” Id. (citing MCCARTHY, supra note 21, §§ 7:3, 8:16, 8:18). “In cases where the
speech is purely commercial, the right of publicity will often trump any free speech claim the defendant
may make.” Id. (citing Comedy III Prod., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001); Winter v.
DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 (1995).
70. Comedy III Prod., Inc., v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 807 (Cal. 2001).
[T]he right of publicity cannot, consistent with the First Amendment, be a right to control
the celebrity’s image by censoring disagreeable portrayals. Once the celebrity thrusts
himself or herself forward into the limelight, the First Amendment dictates that the right
to comment on, parody, lampoon, and make other expressive uses of the celebrity image
must be given broad scope. The necessary implication of this observation is that the right
of publicity is essentially an economic right. What the right of publicity holder possesses
is not a right of censorship, but a right to prevent others from misappropriating the
economic value generated by the celebrity’s fame through the merchandising of the
‘name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness’ of the celebrity.
Id.
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will have a valid cause of action. The existence of the right of publicity
cause of action gives potential plaintiffs a chance to manage their
identity in the eyes of the public and to protect themselves from any use
of their name, image, or likeness that serves to erode the commercial
value of that identity.
III. CIRCUIT COURT APPROACHES TO ANALYZING RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
CLAIMS UNDER § 230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
Currently, federal circuits have taken differing approaches regarding
the scope of immunity provided by § 230 of the CDA in relation to
misappropriation of the right of publicity claims. The Ninth Circuit has
held that a claim for the misappropriation of the right of publicity is
barred by § 230 based on policy reasons. In contrast, within the First
Circuit, the District Court of New Hampshire, accepted the
characterization of the misappropriation of the right of publicity tort as
an invasion of an intellectual property right and has held that a right of
publicity claim is exempt from CDA immunity. Meanwhile, the
Eleventh Circuit avoided making a concrete ruling on whether right of
publicity claims are exempt under § 230. Because the Supreme Court
has yet to rule on the exact scope of what constitutes intellectual
property under § 230, it is unlikely that the circuits will reach a
consensus on how the right of publicity should be treated under the
statute.
A. Public Policy Counts: The Ninth Circuit in Carafano v. Metrosplash
and Perfect 10, Inc. v. CC Bill, LLC
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has taken an expansive view of
the immunization given by § 230, adopting the viewpoint that only
federal intellectual property claims such as copyright and trademark
infringement are exempt from CDA immunity. In Carafano v.
Metrosplash, a case involving “cruel and sadistic identity theft,” the
Ninth Circuit held that a computer match-making service was statutorily
immune under § 230 from claims stemming from the posting of false
content in a dating profile provided by someone posing as another
person. 71 Carafano was a popular actress, who appeared in numerous
films and television shows under the stage name Chase Masterson. 72 An
unknown person using a computer in Berlin posted a trial personal
71. Carafano v. Metrosplash, 339 F.3d 1119, 1120–21 (9th Cir. 2003).
72. Id. at 1121. Carafano has appeared on “Star Trek: Deep Space Nine” and “General
Hospital.”
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profile of Carafano on Matchmaker.com under the identifier
“Chase529.” 73 The profile featured her picture, listed the movies she
appeared in, and provided her home address. 74 As a result of the
improper posting, Carafano began to receive threatening and sexually
explicit messages. 75 She filed a complaint in California state court
against Matchmaker.com and its corporate successors, alleging
misappropriation of the right of publicity. 76
The Ninth Circuit focused on the policy reasons for enacting the
CDA, which gave most Internet service providers immunity from
publishing false or defamatory material so long as the information was
provided by another party. 77 The court felt that allowing tort liability
would have a chilling effect on the large amount of information
communicated via interactive computer services. 78 Therefore, in order
to uphold the speech-protective policy interests behind § 230, the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision that all of Carafano’s claims
were barred by the CDA. 79
In reaching that decision, the court focused on Congress’s reasons for
enacting the CDA, promoting the free exchange of information and
ideas over the Internet and encouraging voluntary monitoring for
offensive material, and noted that reviewing courts have treated CDA
immunity as “quite robust.” 80 Under the “robust” view, courts have
“adopt[ed] a relatively expansive definition of ‘interactive computer
73. Id. The profile stated that “Chase529” was “looking for a one-night stand” and sought a
“hard and dominant” man with “a strong sexual appetite” and that she “liked sort of be[]ing controlled
by a man, in and out of bed.” Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1121–22. Shortly after the posting, Carafano began received sexually explicit
messages in her voicemail and a highly threatening and sexually explicit fax that also threatened her son.
Feeling unsafe in her home, she and her son stayed in hotels away from her home in Los Angeles for a
few months. Id.
76. Id. at 1122. “The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment in a
published opinion.” Id.
77. Id. at 1122–23. The court notes that the text of § 230 itself notes that “interactive computer
services have flourished, to the benefit of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation,”
and that “[i]ncreasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of political,
educational, cultural, and entertainment services.” Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(4), (5) (2006)).
“Congress declared it the ‘policy of the United States’ to ‘promote the continued development of the
Internet and other interactive computer services,’ ‘to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market
that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services,’ and to ‘remove
disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies.’” Id. (citing 47
U.S.C. § 230(b)(1), (2) (4)).
78. Id. at 1124. “Faced with potential liability for each message republished by their services,
interactive computer service providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type of
messages posted.” Id.
79. Id. at 1125.
80. Id. at 1122–23.
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service’ and a relatively restrictive definition of ‘information content
provider,’” which allows an “interactive computer service” to “qualif[y]
for immunity so long as it does not also function as an ‘information
content provider’ for the portion of the statement or publication at
issue.” 81
Under this type of analysis, the court found that
“Matchmaker[.com] [could not] be considered an ‘information content
provider,’” despite the fact that some of the content was formulated in
response to Matchmaker.com’s questionnaire, “because no profile has
any content until a user actively creates it.” 82 Likewise, the court held
that the fact that Matchmaker.com classifies characteristics into
categories and collects answers to essay questions does not transform
Matchmaker.com into the developer of the information. 83 The Ninth
Circuit went on to say that even if Matchmaker could be considered an
“information content provider,” § 230(c)(1) precludes treatment as a
publisher or speaker for “any information provided by another
information content provider.” 84 Therefore, the statute would still bar
Carafano’s claims unless Matchmaker.com created or developed the
particular content at issue; because the court found that
Matchmaker.com did not play a significant role in creating, developing
or “transforming” the content in question, they could not be found
liable. 85
In Perfect 10, Inc. v. CC Bill LLC, the Ninth Circuit explicitly defined
the scope of immunization provided by the CDA, holding that the CDA
immunized interactive computer service providers from state intellectual
property claims, including the misappropriation of the right of publicity,
on policy grounds. 86 The court said that state laws protecting
intellectual property lacked uniformity and “may bear various names,
provide for varying causes of action and remedies, and have varying
purposes and policy goals.” 87 Because material on a website may be
viewed in more than one state at a time, the court believed that allowing
any particular state’s definition of intellectual property to dictate the
boundaries of federal immunity would be contrary to Congress’s
81. Id. at 1123.
82. Id. at 1124.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1125 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2006)) (emphasis added).
85. Id.
86. Perfect 10, Inc. v. CCBill LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2007). Perfect 10, the
publisher of an adult entertainment magazine and the owner of the subscription website perfect10.com,
alleges CCBill violated various intellectual property laws, including, inter alia, right of publicity laws,
by providing services to websites that posted images stolen from Perfect 10’s magazines and websites.
Id. at 1108.
87. Id. at 1118.
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expressed goal of protecting the development of the internet from
different state-law systems 88 The Ninth Circuit construed the term
“intellectual property” to mean “federal intellectual property.” 89
The Ninth Circuit has generally taken an expansive view of the scope
of § 230’s immunity, finding a plaintiff’s claim for the misappropriation
of the right of publicity barred in two cases. Perfect 10, Inc. clarified
the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Carafano by expressly holding that all
state intellectual property claims, including the misappropriation of the
right of publicity, are not subject to the § 230(e)(2) exception.
B. Literal Statutory Interpretation: The First Circuit in Doe v.
Friendfinder Network
In Doe v. Friendfinder Network, the District Court of New Hampshire
reached the opposite conclusion than the Ninth Circuit. In Friendfinder
Network, an unknown person created a female profile with the screen
name “petra03755” on “AdultFriendFinder.com,” which described itself
as the “the World’s Largest SEX and SWINGER Personal
Community.” 90 The profile identified the plaintiff as a recently
separated 40-year old woman living in New Hampshire. 91 The plaintiff
claimed that the biographic information and photograph on the website
identified her as “petra03755.” 92 The plaintiff requested the website
operator to remove the profile, which it did. 93 However, “the profile
allegedly continued to appear, with slight modifications, on other similar
websites operated by the defendants,” and “as ‘teasers’ on Internet
search engines and advertisements on other third-party websites,
including ‘sexually related’ ones.” 94 The plaintiff ultimately sued the
website operator for a variety of claims including “[i]nvasion of
[p]roperty/[i]ntellectual [p]roperty [r]ights” equivalent to the
misappropriation of the right of publicity. 95
88. Id. (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(a), (b) (2006)).
89. Id. at 1119. The court in Perfect 10 is interpreting the § 230(e)(2) of the CDA, which
requires the court to construe § 230(c)(1) in a manner that would neither “limit [n]or expand any law
pertaining to intellectual property.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2).
90. Doe v. Friendfinder Network, 540 F.Supp.2d 288, 291–92 (D.N.H. 2008).
91. Id. at 292.
92. Id. The profile included information on her sexual proclivities, birth date, height, build, hair
and eye color, and an apparently digitally altered nude photograph. Id. The plaintiff learned of the
profile more than a year after it was posted from an acquaintance who had been discussing it with other
members of the plaintiff’s circle who believed the profile to be the plaintiff’s. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. The plaintiff claimed that “these teasers and advertisements served to direct Internet
traffic to the defendants’ own websites, allegedly increasing their profitability.” Id. at 293.
95. Id.
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The district court accepted the plaintiff’s characterization of the
misappropriation of the right of publicity tort as an invasion of an
intellectual property right, meaning that the tort was exempt from CDA
immunity. 96 In reaching this decision, the court relied on dicta from the
First Circuit Court of Appeals. The First Circuit stated, in a case
regarding Florida’s trademark dilution statute, that “[c]laims based on
intellectual property laws are not subject to Section 230 immunity.” 97
The court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s limitation on the definition of
intellectual property to only include “federal intellectual property,”
noting that other courts have joined the First Circuit in assuming that
§ 230(e)(2) excepts state as well as federal intellectual property laws. 98
The District Court of New Hampshire’s finding that intellectual
property law includes both state and federal intellectual property law is
based on an strict interpretation of the language of § 230(e)(2). Citing
First Circuit precedent, the court noted that “[s]tatutory interpretation
begins with the language of the statute” and where the language of the
statute is clear and unambiguous there is no need for further inquiry. 99
Because the language of § 230(e)(2) simply states that “[n]othing in this
section shall be construed to limit or expand any law relating to
intellectual property,” and because the Supreme Court has noted that
“the modifier ‘any’ amounts to ‘expansive language [that] offers no
indication whatsoever that Congress intended [a] limiting construction,’”
the district court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s argument that intellectual
property under § 230 was limited to federal intellectual property. 100 The
court also rejected the Perfect 10 court’s argument regarding the effect
of state law on the manageability of the CDA, stating that they had no
reason to believe that a reading of the statute “to exempt state
intellectual property law would place any materially greater burden on
service providers than they face by having to comply with federal
intellectual property law.” 101
96. Id. at 303.
97. Id. at 298 (citing Universal Comm’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 422–23 (1st Cir.
2007)). Universal Comm’n Sys. was decided on an appeal from the Massachusetts district court.
Defendant Lycos is a Massachusetts corporation with its principal place of business in Massachusetts.
Plaintiff Universal Communications Systems is a Nevada Corporation with its principal place of
business in Florida. Universal Conm’n Sys., 478 F.3d at 414.
98. Friendfinder Network, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 299. See Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d
1316, 1324 (11th Cir. 2006); Gucci Am., Inc., v. Hall & Assocs., 135 F.Supp.2d 409, 413 (S.D.N.Y.
2001).
99. Friendfinder Network, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 299 (citing Ruiz v. Bally Total Fitness Holding
Corp., 496 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235 (1989))).
100. Id. (citing Harrison v. PPG Indus., 446 U.S. 578, 589 (1980)).
101. Id. at 301. The court stated that “neither the Ninth Circuit nor the defendants offered a single
example of how ‘any particular states definition of intellectual property,’ meaningfully enlarges its
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Relying on First Circuit precedent interpreting § 230(e)(2) to exempt
state as well as federal intellectual property claims from the scope of the
Act’s immunity provision and Supreme Court statutory interpretation
precedent interpreting “any” to have an expansive meaning, the District
Court of New Hampshire, in Doe v. Friendfinder Network, accepted the
plaintiff’s characterization of the misappropriation of the right of
publicity claim as an invasion of an intellectual property right and
exempted the claim from § 230’s immunity provision.
C. Dodging the Issue: The Eleventh Circuit in Almeida v. Amazon.com
In Almeida v. Amazon.com, a woman who, as a minor, was
photographed for an artistic exhibit with her mother’s consent brought
an action against Amazon.com, Inc. for displaying her image on its
websites in furtherance of its sale of the book Anjos Proibidos
(“Forbidden Angels”), asserting right of publicity claims under Florida’s
commercial misappropriation statute. 102 The plaintiff did not consent to
the use of her picture and did not receive compensation for the use of her
image. 103
When faced with the issue of whether the CDA preempts right of
publicity claims, the Eleventh Circuit stated that “there appears to be no
dispute that the right of publicity is a type of intellectual property
right.” 104 The court seemed to agree with the plaintiff’s argument that
the right of publicity is a widely recognized intellectual property
right. 105 However, even though the court agreed with the plaintiff that
the district court should have addressed § 230(e)(2) before invoking the
CDA’s grant of immunity, the court also failed to address the issue,
protections beyond those conferred by federal law, or how intellectual property regimes ‘vary widely
from state to state’ in substance.” Id.
102. Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1318–19. Anjos Proibidos is a photographic book displaying black and
white photographs of girls between the ages of ten and seventeen. Id. The photographer and the book’s
publisher were prosecuted for creating a work of child pornography and were acquitted. Id. Originally
the Plaintiff Almeida was featured inside of the First Edition of the book that was approved by her
mother. Id. However, in 2000, a second edition was published where her picture was featured on the
book’s cover. Id. It was the Second Edition that was offered for sale on Amazon’s website. Id.
103. Id. at 1318.
104. Id. at 1323.
105. Id. at 1322. The court cited several sources that recognize the right of publicity as an
intellectual property right: ETW Corp v. Jireh Publ’g. Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003) (“the right
of publicity is an intellectual property right of recent origin which has been defined as the inherent right
of every human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity”); Allison v. Vintage Sports
Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1448 (the common law right of publicity is an intellectual property right for
purposes of the first-sale doctrine); and J. Thomas McCarthy, Melville B. Nimmer & the Rights of
Publicity: A Tribute, 34 UCLA. L. REV. 1703, 1712 (1987) (the right of publicity has “matured into a
distinctive legal category occupying an important place in the law of intellectual property”).
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stating that regardless of the answer, “the district court did not need to
address the difficult issues of application of the CDA under the facts of
this case.” 106 The court held that since the plaintiff’s right of publicity
claim would not withstand a motion to dismiss under the law, it was
unnecessary for the district court to determine whether the CDA
preempts a state law right of publicity claim. 107 Despite the Eleventh
Circuit’s recognition of the right of publicity as an intellectual property
right, the court refused to infer that as an intellectual property right, right
of publicity claims should be exempted from § 230 immunity.
Therefore, a split among federal circuits interpreting § 230(e)(2) still
exists. The Ninth Circuit held that the term intellectual property only
encompasses federal intellectual property for purposes of the statute,
whereas the District Court of New Hampshire, relying on First Circuit
precedent, concluded that § 230(e)(2) encompasses both state and
federal intellectual property claims resulting in an exemption from § 230
immunity for right of publicity claims.
The circuit courts have been unable to reach a consensus regarding
the treatment of the misappropriation of the right of publicity tort under
§ 230. The CDA has been broadly interpreted to provide immunity for
operators and users of interactive computer services, who publish
information provided by a third party, from even the most egregious of
torts against individuals. 108 However, § 230(e)(2) requires courts to
construe the CDA in a manner that would neither limit nor expand any
law pertaining to intellectual property. 109 As a result, federal courts
appear to be split on exactly how to characterize misappropriation of the
right of publicity. The Ninth Circuit, viewing misappropriation of the
right of publicity from the tort perspective, found that the claim was
barred under the CDA. 110 Conversely, the District Court of New
Hampshire viewed the plaintiff’s misappropriation of the right of
publicity claim as an intellectual property claim that was exempt from
CDA immunity. 111 The Eleventh Circuit chose to decide the issue on
other grounds. 112 Therefore, clarification in the law is necessary to
ensure that all plaintiffs with right of publicity claims receive his or her
day in court.

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1324.
Id.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2).
Carafano v. Metrosplash, 339 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2003).
Doe v. Friendfinder Network, 540 F. Supp. 2d 288 (D.N.H. 2008).
Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1324 (11th Cir. 2006).
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IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In resolving the question as to whether the § 230(e)(2) intellectual
property exemption applies to right of publicity claims, this Part
addresses the right of publicity’s traditional characterization as an
intellectual property right and why its status as a state law doctrine
should have no effect on this classification. This Part then addresses
why the strict statutory interpretation of § 230(e)(2) favors the exclusion
of right of publicity claims from § 230’s statutory immunity and how the
language of § 230(e)(2) could be further clarified. Finally, this Part
illustrates how allowing right of publicity claims despite § 230
immunity furthers the policy reasons behind right of publicity law and
does not harm the policy interests promoted by Congress in enacting
§ 230.
A. The Right of Publicity as a Traditional Intellectual Property Right
The right of publicity is traditionally a state law claim, and is
traditionally considered an intellectual property issue. Black’s Law
Dictionary explicitly lists publicity rights as a recognized category of
intellectual property as well as other traditional state law doctrines such
as trade-secret rights and rights against unfair competition. 113
Furthermore, publicity rights serve a purpose similar to traditional
intellectual property rights. The state’s interest in providing a right of
publicity is “closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law,
focusing on the right of the individual to reap the reward of his
endeavors.” 114 While patent and copyright law protects the endeavors of
authors and inventors in creating valuable writings and inventions, 115 the
right of publicity similarly protects the endeavors of those who develop
the marketable value of their identity.
Despite its traditional characterization as a member of the intellectual
property law family, there has been some argument that since it is
traditionally a state-law claim it should be treated differently. However,
right of publicity case law is relatively similar throughout the states, and
113. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 813 (7th ed. 1999) (defining intellectual property as “[a]
category of intangible rights protecting commercially valuable products of the human intellect. The
category comprises primarily trademark, copyright, and patent rights, but also includes trade-secret
rights, publicity rights, moral rights, and rights against unfair competition”).
114. Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1323 (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 573
(1977)).
115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries”).
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attempts to federalize the doctrine illustrate that the right of publicity is a
doctrine of enough significance to be codified along with its more
famous cousins copyright, trademark and patent. 116
B. Strict Literal Interpretation of § 230(e)(2)
The strict literal statutory interpretation of § 230(e)(2) supports the
argument that right of publicity claims should be allowed despite the
§ 230 immunity provided to other tort claims not related to intellectual
property. The language of § 230(e)(2) itself does not suggest a
limitation to federal intellectual property, but simply states that “nothing
in this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to
intellectual property.” 117 The word “any” is interpreted broadly,
indicating that Congress did not intend a narrow construction of the
statutory language. 118 Furthermore, Congress has expressly used the
words “federal” and “state” elsewhere in the statute when its intent was
to limit the scope of the statutory provision. 119 Section 230(e)(1) states
that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to impair the
enforcement of [named federal criminal statutes] or any other Federal
criminal statute” and § 230(e)(3) states that “[n]othing in this section
shall be construed to prevent any State from enforcing any State law that
is consistent with the section.” 120 The content of § 230(e)(1) and § 230
(e)(3) illustrates that “where Congress wished to distinguish between
state and federal law in § 230, it knew how to do so.” 121 It follows that
the use of “any” in § 230(e)(2) in contrast to the use of “federal”
elsewhere in the statute suggests that Congress did not intend for “any”
to be interpreted as interchangeable with “federal.” “‘Where Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in
another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that
Congress . . . intentionally’” makes such decisions. 122
Plaintiffs should be allowed to recover damages for the
misappropriation of the right of publicity because Congress did not
intend any sort of limiting construction and because the right of
116. See Symposium, supra note 41.
117. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2006).
118. Doe v. Friendfinder Network, 540 F. Supp. 2d 288, 299 (D.N.H. 2008) (quoting Harrison v.
PPG Indus., 446 U.S. 578 (1980)).
119. Id. at 299–300.
120. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1), (3).
121. Friendfinder Network, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 300 (citing Voicenet Commn’s, Inc. v. Corbett, No.
04-1318, 2006 WL 2506318, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2006)).
122. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 173 (2001) (quoting Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23,
29–30 (1997)).
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publicity is a widely accepted intellectual property right. A state
law/federal law distinction cannot be discerned from the face of the
statute, and therefore, should not cause right of publicity claims to be
treated differently from their more well-known intellectual property
cousins.
C. The Need for Statutory Clarification of § 230(e)(2)
Despite § 230(e)(2)’s clear language, some courts, citing public
policy concerns, still believe that a distinction should be made based on
the right of publicity’s status as a state law claim. In order to encourage
the strict literal interpretation of the statute in circuits that are
proponents of enforcing the public policy reasons for the passage of
§ 230, a possible solution may be for the legislature to amend the statute
to include an express definition of “intellectual property,” and to make
clear that the right of publicity falls within that definition.
To further emphasize Congress’ intent to exempt all forms of
intellectual property, both state and federal, from the scope of CDA
immunity, Congress could amend § 230(e)(2) to include an express
definition of intellectual property. The new statutory definition of
intellectual property could possibly be based on the Black’s Law
Dictionary definition, defining “intellectual property” as “a category of
intangible rights protecting commercially valuable products of the
human intellect, including both state and federally created rights.” 123
Expressly defining intellectual property to include both state and
federal law should eliminate any split among the circuits regarding
whether the right of publicity is intellectual property. However, to
ensure the right of publicity’s protection under § 230(e)(2), an express
listing of all categories of intellectual property exempted from CDA
immunity under the statute should be added to the statutory definition of
intellectual property. For example, the statute could read, “intellectual
property includes, but is not limited to: trademarks, copyrights, patents,
trade-secrets, publicity rights, moral rights, and rights against unfair
competition.” 124 If the right of publicity is expressly listed as an
included category, courts will have to follow the explicit, plain language
of the statute.

123. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 813 (7th ed. 1999).
124. See id.
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D. The Public Policy Benefits of Exempting Right of Publicity Claims
from § 230 Immunity
Despite the fact that the clear language of the statute supports
exempting the right of publicity from CDA immunity, there are
competing policy concerns regarding the protection of internet content
providers from the floodgates of tort litigation, the prevention of the
chilling of valuable free speech over the Internet and the maintenance of
voluntary monitoring of offensive material. However, the policy
reasons for having a right of publicity are equally compelling, and
arguably, the natural right of every human being to control their image
and likeness, self-definition, and their personal economic interests
should be balanced against the natural right of a person’s free speech.
Allowing right of publicity claims does not necessarily hinder
Congress’s policy interests in passing § 230 and can further the goals of
having a right of publicity.
1. Exempting Misappropriation of the Right of Publicity Claims from
§ 230 Immunity Promotes the Policy Goals of the State Right of
Publicity Policy
Allowing claims for the misappropriation of the right of publicity to
be exempt from § 230 immunity furthers the public policy goals of
allowing persons to possess a right of publicity. First, exempting right
of publicity claims from CDA immunity supports the natural rights and
autonomous self-determination justifications for a right of publicity.
Following the Ninth Circuit’s precedent in barring such claims, deprives
potential plaintiffs of the right to control what is rightfully theirs—
namely their identity and public perception of that identity. Conversely,
allowing right of publicity claims gives potential plaintiffs a way to
protect their identity and others’ perception of it by creating a cause of
action against those owners and operators of interactive computer
services that allowed false information about the victim to be posted on
their websites.
Furthermore, following Ninth Circuit precedent would deprive
potential plaintiffs of possible opportunities to benefit from their
identity’s marketable value and would erode the potential marketable
value of their identity. For example, having one’s identity associated
with suggestive dialogue and questionable sexual activities could ruin an
individual’s reputation, resulting in loss of employment or hindrance in
finding new job opportunities. Allowing a potential plaintiff to bring
claims for the misappropriation of the right of publicity against operators
and users of interactive computer services provides an extra level of
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protection against unfair damage to an individual’s commercial value.
Another justification for the right of publicity is that it helps protect
against fraudulent business practices. However, barring right of
publicity claims under the CDA would only serve to encourage unfair
business practices on the part of internet service providers. For
example, in Doe v. Friendfinder Network Inc., one of the plaintiff’s
complaints centered around the fact that AdultFriendFinder.com caused
portions of the “petra03755” profile to appear as “teasers” on internet
search engines and as advertisements on other third party websites,
including “sexually related ones.” 125 If the District Court of New
Hampshire had followed the Ninth Circuit’s lead, the plaintiff would
have no redress against this unfair use of the commercial value of her
identity. In order to protect plaintiffs from being associated with
products or services they do not support and prevent consumers from
being misled, claims for misappropriation of the right of publicity
should be allowed in order to prevent deceptive practices.
2. Exempting Misappropriation of the Right of Publicity Claims from
§ 230 Immunity Preserves the Policy Goals of Congress’s Legislative
Intent
In addition to furthering the policy goals of the right of publicity,
allowing misappropriation of the right of publicity claims under § 230
will preserve Congress’s policy goals. The free exchange of information
over the internet will not be curtailed by preventing internet service
providers from allowing third party content providers to post false and
defamatory material about persons whose identity they have usurped. If
anything, protecting the commercial identity of such persons should
increase the amount of truthful speech available on the internet, which is
arguably more beneficial to the public than having large amounts of
false material on the internet. Even though free speech is a natural right
recognized by the Founders as being constitutionally protectable, courts
have found that certain types of speech, such as defamation, obscenity,
and subversive speech, are less deserving of First Amendment protection
because they are of little social benefit and harm the individual rights of
others. 126 Arguably, allowing third parties to take others’ identities and
125. Friendfinder Network, 540 F. Supp. 2d at 293.
126. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 n.5 (1985). The
Supreme Court recognized that all speech is not of equal First Amendment importance and offered
several examples of speech which has historically been accorded no protection at all, including obscene
speech, fighting words, speech advocating the violent overthrow of the government, and certain kinds of
commercial speech. See id. See also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul Minn., 505 U.S. 377 (1992)
(recognizing defamation as a historically regulated category).
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publish false statements about such persons has little social benefit and
can be very damaging to the commercial value of people’s identity.
Commercial speech is another area of limited First Amendment
protection. 127 Since right of publicity claims often involve the unfair
commercial use of one’s identity, it seems to do no harm to goals of free
speech to limit harmful speech in the commercial context. Just as false
information in advertising is not protected, false information about a
person, who has a valuable commercial identity, should not be protected.
Allowing right of publicity claims under § 230 will encourage
voluntary monitoring of offensive material by providers and users of
interactive computers services. Such parties, knowing that they may still
face liability for right of publicity claims under the statute, will have a
greater incentive to continually monitor their sites for false postings.
Many cases involving right of publicity claims involve plaintiffs who are
concerned about the posting of sexually explicit content regarding
themselves. Therefore, monitoring for such false postings will aid the
policy goal of protecting children from obscene materials.
Right of publicity law developed to protect an individuals’ rights in
their own identities, whereas § 230 was passed by Congress in order to
protect the dissemination of free speech on the internet and the voluntary
self-monitoring for offensive material by internet service providers.
Despite their seeming opposition, both sets of public policy goals can be
furthered by exempting right of publicity claims from § 230 immunity.
V. CONCLUSION
Traditionally, courts have interpreted § 230 of the CDA to provide
immunity from tort liability to operators and users of interactive
computer services who publish information provided by a third party. 128
However, circuits are in dispute regarding the scope of this immunity
with respect to the misappropriation of the right of publicity tort. 129 The
Ninth Circuit has held that this claim is barred under § 230.130
However, the District Court of New Hampshire has held that the First
Circuit’s characterization of this tort as an intellectual property right

127. Because the First Amendment does not protect false and misleading commercial speech and
because even non-misleading commercial speech is generally subject to somewhat lesser First
Amendment protection, the right of publicity may often trump the right of advertisers to make use of
celebrity figures. Comedy III Prod., Inc., v. Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001) (citing Central
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563–64, 566 (1980)).
128. See supra Part II.A.
129. See supra Part III.
130. See supra Part III.A.
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precludes the application of CDA immunity. 131 Section 230(e)(2)
requires courts to construe the CDA in a manner that would neither limit
nor expand any existing law relating to intellectual property. There is
general agreement that Congress meant to exclude federal intellectual
property claims such as copyright and trademark, but there is debate
over whether state-law claims, such as the right of publicity, are
exempted from the broad immunity provided under the CDA. The First
Circuit’s approach, in treating even state-created intellectual property
rights as exempted from CDA immunity under the language of
§ 230(e)(2), is the approach most faithful to statutory interpretation,
legal history, and public policy. By allowing plaintiffs to bring
misappropriation of the right of publicity claims, despite the immunity
that § 230 gives to other tort claims, courts will protect victims of virtual
identity theft while maintaining the CDA’s goals.
Perhaps, the most effective way to remedy the circuit split is to have
the legislature clarify the language of § 230(e)(2) by including an
express statutory definition of “intellectual property.” By listing the
right of publicity among the different types of intellectual property
protected under § 230(e)(2), courts will be bound by the strict literal
interpretation of the statute, resulting in uniform application of the law
across the circuits.
Think back to the hypothetical situation in the Introduction and
imagine it is one year later. Congress has passed an amendment to
§ 230(e)(2) expressly listing the right of publicity as a protected
intellectual property claim, exempt from § 230 immunity. You now
have a legitimate cause of action and may have your day in court to
defend your reputation that was unfairly tarnished by a stranger who
decided to post a false profile on the Internet featuring your name and
likeness. You now file a complaint listing a misappropriation of the
right of publicity as grounds for recovery and your claim is not denied
on a pre-trial motion. After successfully litigating your claim, in
addition to damages, your reputation is finally cleared and you can begin
to rebuild the commercial value that you had lost.
In the age of the internet, anyone could be the victim of a stranger
who with access to a photo or biographical information, could convince
the outside world that you are living a secret double life. In order to
prevent such “publicity stunts” and protect citizens against the unfair use
of their commercial identity, reading § 230 (e)(2) to allow right of
publicity claims could be a key first step in allowing citizens to take
control of their lives and futures.

131. See supra Part III.B.
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